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This paper investigates the effect of merger-driven market concentration on the mark-
ups of non-merging rival firms in Europe’s paper manufacturing industry. Using a 
representative data set of 400 independently-owned companies spanning a ten-year 
period, we aim to disentangle the impact of full-scale mergers and acquisitions from 
that due to other concentration-increasing developments. We find a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between price-cost margins and overall industry 
consolidation, as captured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman and four-firm indexes. 
However, takeover-related market share amalgamation has a negative impact, albeit of 
more modest proportions. The latter result seems to be driven by vertical transactions, 
suggesting that input-side channels, much as product price competition, may explain 
non-merging firms’ mark-up response. 
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This paper studies the eﬀect of corporate restructuring via mergers and ac-
quisitions on the competitive environment in paper manufacturing across the
European Economic Area (EEA). Focusing on non-merging ﬁrms’ mark-ups,
we empirically test the conventional wisdom that concentration-increasing
takeovers weaken competitors’ incentives to pursue productive eﬃciency.
While data limitations prevent a distinction between price-side and cost-side
developments, increased price-cost margins in response to mergers can gene-
rally be perceived as a sign to that eﬀect.1 By contrast, a negative impact
on outsiders’ mark-ups, through either channel, would indicate impending
pressure to enhance eﬃciency. The question has policy relevance in as much
as theoretical predictions that form the basis of antitrust enforcement point
to enhanced scope for slack in ﬁrms’ internal organization in the aftermath of
concentration-increasing transactions. Indeed, the possibility for an eﬃciency
defence was not explicitly admitted under the old EU merger regulation, in
force until 2004. Even if the feared anti-competitive outcome of a takeover
could be oﬀset by eﬃciency gains, they were not likely to receive adequate
weight in the Commission’s assessment.
We base our investigation of takeover-related competitive eﬀects on a sam-
ple of European paper manufacturing ﬁrms, as the sector has been marked by
important transactions over the time period for which we have data. More-
over, while certainly present, product diﬀerentiation may be relatively less
pronounced in that industry, which is in line with our econometric model’s
assumptions.2 We ﬁnd that non-merging ﬁrms’ mark-ups are increasing with
overall market concentration, as captured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman and
four-ﬁrm indexes. However, takeover-related output consolidation generally
has a depressing eﬀect on price-cost margins, indicating some pressure to
pursue productive eﬃciency. Additional evidence, linking this result to ver-
1Even if the result is driven by cost-cutting, it may reﬂect industry-wide spillovers that
enable cost reduction without lasting impetus to improve eﬃciency.
2An overview of the European Commission’s market assessments with regard to paper
manufacturing is provided in the Appendix. We must also note that our data reﬂect com-
pany activities and not speciﬁc products, which constrains our approximation of relevant
markets.
1tical integration, points to possible post-merger factor market repercussions
rather than enhanced output price competition. Although a mark-up frame-
work is not ideally suited for comprehensive merger assessments, it oﬀers a
beﬁtting link to structural models of ﬁrm behavior and it is actually quite
rich in terms of uncovering hard facts. We must nevertheless keep in mind
that results may be obscured by methodological problems and limitations
inherent in the available data. While an investigation of merger control’s
eﬀectiveness is beyond the scope of this paper, our ﬁndings highlight the
importance of ex post evaluations, which could be systematically carried out
by competition authorities.
The paper is organized as follows: we begin by providing a more detailed
background to our investigation and proceed to describe our econometric ap-
proach. A discussion of data sources and related measurement issues precedes
the presentation of results. A summary of the ﬁndings concludes.
Background
Competition policy’s primary concern with takeovers is the scope for anti-
competitive harm, which has traditionally been viewed as an increasing func-
tion of market concentration. Mergers may facilitate the emergence and
abuse of dominance, be it unilateral or collective, typically perceived to re-
sult in price increases to the detriment of consumers.3 In the textbook case
of a homogeneous product and no input market rigidities, a dominant posi-
tion enables the merged entity to proﬁtably raise price above marginal cost,
regardless of the resulting drop in sales, while competitors beneﬁt from both
the higher mark-up and the diversion of demand. Thus, the new equilibrium
implies a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers and a dead-weight
loss to society as a whole, relative to the previous state. Using a framework of
Cournot competition in a homogeneous product market, Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) demonstrate that a horizontal merger must involve considerable cost
savings in order to trigger a price drop. Speciﬁcally, the combined entity must
3As product quality could also be aﬀected following a merger, the underlying notion is
that of quality-adjusted price eﬀects.
2achieve a substantially lower marginal cost than did any of the pre-merger
constituents. The result is even more pronounced if the takeover prompts a
reduction in the intensity of rivalry relative to Cournot behavior. Under the
assumptions of symmetric product diﬀerentiation and constant marginal cost,
the models of both Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and Werden and Froeb
(1994) also oﬀer a fairly general proof that a price-raising merger would trig-
ger price increases by rivals. Overall, higher industry-wide mark-ups may be
a plausible outcome of takeover-driven consolidation in the absence of input
market rigidities or internal eﬃciencies of suﬃcient magnitude.4
On the other hand, the recombination of assets via mergers and acquisi-
tions may enable ﬁrms to achieve signiﬁcant economies of scale or scope, as
well as more favorable terms of funding or input sourcing. It is also possi-
ble that the combined entity’s production possibility frontier extends beyond
joint pre-integration capabilities, altogether.5 In such cases, the merger may
constitute a shortcut to extensive experience or a necessary guarantee for
undertaking speciﬁc investments.6 Thus, a takeover may create an aggres-
sive competitor that would undercut output prices and force lower mark-ups
upon rivals, unless they have the ability to rapidly reduce costs as well. A
similar outcome can also emerge through the cost channel if the merged en-
tity is able to inﬂuence input markets to competitors’ disadvantage. Focusing
on vertical mergers without an eﬃciency component, Ordover et al. (1990)
demonstrate that an equilibrium involving foreclosure is possible, as long as
the downstream ﬁrms’ revenues increase with the input price.
The various modes and models of competition yield ambiguous predic-
tions about the conduct of merged ﬁrms, relative to the pre-integration situ-
ation. While eﬃciency and market power considerations underpin the anal-
ysis of post-merger competitive outcomes, they do not exhaust the plausible
reasons why companies integrate, which in turn may have a bearing on the
4Introducing spacial considerations, Reitzes and Levy (1995) demonstrate that price
discrimination under asymmetric competition may limit the impact on both outsider ﬁrms
and potential rivals’ entry incentives.
5Neven and Seabright (2003) highlight the importance of intangible assets for eﬃciency-
enhancing mergers, but also note the volatile success prospects of such transactions.
6The latter channel is emphasized in the property rights approach to the ﬁrm. See
Hart (1995) for a discussion.
3intensity of rivalry. In line with the Coasian view, mergers can oﬀer a way of
internalizing exchange transactions that would not be feasible through the
market mechanism. Managers are also prone to engage in takeovers in pursuit
of personal ambitions, or on the basis of erroneous expectations stemming
from their bounded rationality. Moreover, the competitive environment is
also aﬀected by the possibility of new entrants, failing rivals, upgrades to
product speciﬁcations, and supplier (customer) bargaining power in the in-
put (product) markets. Unfortunately, the available theoretical frameworks
cannot reﬂect the complex interaction of possible takeover consequences in
a comprehensive manner. Quantitative analyses could shed additional light
on outcomes, but are also prone to ambigiuty.
The empirical literature on mergers and acquisitions is largely dominated
by investigations of the integrating ﬁrms’ performance, typically relying on
stock market or accounting data.7 Event studies ﬁnd mostly positive abnor-
mal stock market reactions upon takeover bid announcement, driven mainly
by an increase of the target ﬁrm’s share price. Ex post evidence on share-
holder valuation is mixed, but suggests that long-term performance may be
related to the type of deal concluded. Proﬁt-ﬂow investigations generally
reveal a high incidence of unproﬁtable mergers and modest gains for the suc-
cessfully merged ﬁrms. However, any ex post analysis of integrating ﬁrms’
returns is constrained by the inability to observe the corresponding coun-
terfactual. On the other hand, evidence from a relatively limited number
of studies points to a positive relationship between takeovers and product
price increases.8 Outsider ﬁrms’ share price reactions upon announcement
of a merger and its subsequent challenge by antitrust authorities have been
the subject of a few investigations. Unfortunately, the evidence available to
date is inconclusive and biased toward concentrations in the United States.
The ﬁndings of Stillman (1983), Eckbo (1983) and Schumann (1993) suggest
7See Pautler (2003) or Tichy (2001) for recent surveys. Event studies rely on the
assumption that share prices reﬂect ﬁrm values, including accurate discounting of the
merged entity’s future performance. On the other hand, company accounts data provide
noisy measures of true factor utilization.
8Barton and Sherman (1984) analyze the price eﬀects of two acquisitions in the micro-
ﬁlm market. Fare changes associated with airline mergers have been investigated by Kim
and Singal (1993), Borenstein (1990) and Werden et al. (1991).
4modest positive eﬀects on rivals’ share prices at the time takeover bids are
made. However, outsider ﬁrms’ stock market returns are not sensitive to the
announcement of antitrust complaints. By contrast, Banerjee and Eckard
(1998) report that non-merging competitors suﬀered signiﬁcant value losses
during the 1897-1903 U.S. merger wave. Focusing on airline mergers between
1985 and 1988, Singal (1996) observes that rivals’ share prices do not diﬀer,
on average, from a value-weighted index of non-merging and non-competing
airlines. Nevertheless, competitors’ abnormal returns are positively corre-
lated with changes in route-speciﬁc concentration, but negatively correlated
with the number of airports the merging ﬁrms share. By and large, the
available evidence precludes robust inferences regarding mergers’ eﬀects on
the competitive environment. This study aims to supplement the empirical
literature with indicative ﬁndings from a relatively unexplored angle.
Empirical Framework
Our empirical investigation is based on an approach to mark-up estimation
developed by Roeger (1995) that builds on a methodology pioneered by Hall
(1988). In an imperfectly competitive setting, ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization
would drive a wedge between the value of marginal product and the corre-
sponding factor cost.9 As suggested by Hall (1988), the price-cost margin can
be estimated from the relationship between contemporaneous ﬂuctuations in
output and average factor input.
Consider ﬁrm i operating at time t according to a standard production
function, homogeneous of degree γ:
Yit = AitF(Lit,Mit,Kit) (1)
In the adopted notation A,L,M and K stand for Hicks-neutral technical
progress, labor, material inputs and capital, respectively.10 Under the cur-
9In the assumed Cobb-Douglas functional form, there is a uniform gap between each
input’s cost and respective marginal product.
10Following Domowitz et al. (1988), Norrbin (1993) and Oliveira-Martins, Pilat, and
Scarpetta (1996), the production function is extended to incorporate material inputs and
5rent speciﬁcation, the technical progress term can accommodate both inter-
industry heterogeneity and ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerences in technology. Logarith-




























Assuming Cournot behavior in imperfectly competitive product markets, the
partial derivatives with respect to the factors of production can be derived





























, where N =L,M,K (3)
Market power enables ﬁrms to set the value of each input’s marginal prod-
uct, Pt(∂Y/∂N)it, above the respective factor cost PNt. Retaining a general
formulation for the production function’s degree of homogeneity, the inputs’
shares in total revenue sum to (γ/µ), where γ – the scale parameter – does
not necessarily equal one.12 Denoting logarithmic diﬀerences with lower case
letters, substituting for the partial derivatives and rearranging terms yields
an extended version of the framework proposed by Hall (1988):









While this variant of the original methodology allows separating the mark-
deﬁned over sales, rather than value added. In cases where a signiﬁcant portion of variable
cost is attributed to intermediate inputs, their omission would cause an upward bias in the
mark-up estimates. Moreover, as pointed out by Basu and Fernald (1997), value added is
a problematic proxy for output in the absence of perfect competition.
11Likewise, the ﬁrst-order conditions for cost minimization imply (∂Y/∂N)it = PN/λ.
By the Envelope Theorem λ = (∂C/∂Y )it, the marginal cost of production. Thus,
(∂Y/∂N)it = µit(PN/P)t























6up and scale coeﬃcients, it does not avoid the inherent endogeneity problem.
Proper estimation of equation 4 depends on the availability of suitable in-
strumental variables to address the correlation between unobservable produc-
tivity shocks and input choices.13 As suggested by Levinsohn (1993), ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation could be used if the nature of the endogeneity is assumed
to be constant over time. Olley and Pakes (1996) propose a polynomial of
investment expenditure to address the possible simultaneity bias, whereas
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) favor intermediate inputs as a control proxy. In
turn, Roeger (1995) applies Hall’s reasoning to the corresponding cost func-
tion and uses the interaction of the primal and dual approaches to derive a
testable equation in nominal terms.




The linear function is homogeneous of degree 1 in Lit,Mit and Kit and can
be expressed in terms of unit cost as Z(PLt,PMt,PKt) = C(PLt,PMt,PKt,1).
Since F(.) is homogeneous of degree γ in the respective factor inputs, C(.)
is homogeneous of degree 1
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13The instruments Harrison (1994) relies on include the nominal exchange rate, an
energy price index, the real sectoral wage and the ﬁrm’s debt.
7Taking the diﬀerence between the respective movements in output price and
in marginal cost, and substituting for the technological change term in equa-





It is straightforward to derive the equivalent expression in terms of the Lerner
index, (1 − γ/µ), as in Roeger (1995). Denoting the left-hand side as dq
and the right-hand side as dx, we obtain a simple testable equation, which
we extend with additional interaction terms to study the eﬀects of market
concentration:
dqit=β1dxit+β2dxit×CTRt+β3dxit×MPTt+β4dxit×GRWct+τi+it (9)
Since productivity shocks are eliminated by substitution in the interaction of
the primal and dual approaches, a non-zero error term in equation 9 would
capture measurement error that is likely to stem from inadequate account-
ing for the inputs’ true utilization levels. To study the eﬀects of mergers
and acquisitions on ﬁrms’ price-cost margins, we interact dx with alterna-
tive measures of market concentration, CTRt, computed at the 3-digit level
of NACE industrial classiﬁcation.15 We focus primarily on takeover-driven
market share amalgamation ﬁgures, along with auxiliary breakdowns by deal
type, but consider also the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman and four-ﬁrm indexes tra-
ditionally used to assess competitive outcomes. As mergers have a direct
bearing on insider ﬁrms’ production decisions, we use output consolidation
proxies based, in turn, on market shares at the time of transaction and the
corresponding ﬁgures for the subsequent year. An impulse dummy variable,
MPTt, is included to control for ﬁrms’ involvement in more than one deal
14The derivation of equations 7 and 8 is underpinned by the assumption that µ and γ
remain constant within the period of diﬀerentiation. See Joergensen and Hylleberg (1998)
for a discussion and an alternative derivation using the deﬁnition of average mark-up. A
comparative analysis of the primal and dual approaches is presented by Kee (2004).
15Further disaggregation would separate companies with diversiﬁed operations into an
outside market of their own, as they cannot be associated with a primary 4-digit code.
Since in reality ﬁrms rarely focus exclusively on the production of a single good, it is prefer-
able to avoid a distinction that may constitute a stronger deviation from the unobservable
relevant markets.
8over time. As an alternative, we also consider the eﬀects on a sub-sample
of outsiders that excludes ﬁrms upon their initial participation in a merger.
Country-level real GDP growth is included as an additional interaction term
to account for cyclical eﬀects. Time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics,
such as managers’ abilities or sunk costs, are captured by τi. We use a
dummy variable to distinguish between price-cost margins corresponding to
the industry’s broadly deﬁned downstream and upstream subsegments at the
3-digit level. Controls for country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in mark-ups, as well as
time ﬁxed eﬀects, are also incorporated in the regressions.16
A number of critical remarks regarding our methodology are in order.
An important tradeoﬀ between the approaches of Hall (1988) and Roeger
(1995) is the ability to take account of actual returns to scale versus min-
imizing endogeneity and measurement biases. Estimating mark-ups with
the former method is hindered by data requirements that become virtually
unattainable at a higher level of sectoral disaggregation. Besides appropri-
ate deﬂators for output, capital and materials, one needs to ﬁnd suitable
instruments to address the endogeneity resulting from potential correlation
between unobserved demand or productivity shocks and the individual ﬁrm’s
input choices. Considerable ﬁrm heterogeneity within a single sector would
imply a lot of noise when aggregate deﬂators and poor instruments are ap-
plied to accounting ﬁgures. By introducing a cost-based expression for the
unobservable technology term, Roeger (1995) oﬀers a convenient solution to
the most important endogeneity and measurement problems.17 Clearly, the
underlying constant returns presumption would lead to downward (upward)
biased mark-up estimates in the presence of increasing (decreasing) returns
to scale. However, any attempt to compute the inﬂuence of non-constant re-
turns would raise additional questions regarding the appropriate functional
form and estimation technique. As long as the mark-up estimates are consis-
16Implementation of the Single Market programme has been beset with delays and
continues to be far from uniform across member states. Accordingly, it is not unrealistic to
expect diﬀerent reactions across national markets, especially among ﬁrms whose operations
are geographically concentrated.
17However, the transformation of book value capital ﬁgures into current replacement cost
implies recourse to an aggregate price index for both approaches. This issue is present in
all estimations based on accounting data.
9tently biased, the corresponding intertemporal evolution should be unaﬀected
and would allow us to adequately capture the impact of market concentra-
tion. This amounts to making the assumption that over the studied period
outsider ﬁrms did not experience signiﬁcant downsizing or rapid growth. For
empirical tractability, the literature on mark-up estimation typically assumes
that companies within the same industry face identical productivity shocks
to inputs and apply the same mark-up, which is constant in a given period.
How reasonable these assumptions are depends crucially on the exact nature
of the panel data set and the hypotheses tested. Finally, a shortcoming of the
data derived from ﬁnancial statements of multi-product ﬁrms, a considerable
portion of our sample, is the inability to disentangle ﬁgures corresponding to
individual products. Therefore, we must study more broadly deﬁned struc-
tures than what is typically likely to qualify as the relevant market.
Data and Measurement Issues
Data Description
Standardized annual company accounts were obtained from the Amadeus
database maintained by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. This unique
source with pan-European coverage oﬀers harmonized ﬁnancial statements
based on registered ﬁlings with the respective national statistical oﬃces. We
focus our investigation on manufacturing ﬁrms operating primarily in the pa-
per manufacturing sector (NACE heading 21) across the 15 core EU member
states and Norway, which at the time constituted the European Economic
Area.18 To minimize the noise prone to arise from complex ownership ar-
rangements, we constrain our sample to the consolidated accounts of ulti-
mate owners and the ﬁnancial statements of independent companies without
any subsidiaries. Any aﬃliate linked to a parent ﬁrm by more than 50 per
cent of its shares, or with an unknown percentage, is not taken into account
18For lack of ﬁrm-level data, Iceland and Liechtenstein are not included in the analysis.
This omission should not bias the results signiﬁcantly, unless the headquarters of major
paper manufacturers were based in those countries.
10as a separate entity in the investigation. The ﬁnancial statements of such
subsidiaries are reﬂected in the owners’ consolidated accounts on the basis
of the respective shareholdings. We construct our sample from 5 annual ver-
sions of Amadeus in order to trace target companies’ sales volumes and input
costs up to the time of the merger, as well as rivals that may have exited
the market for other reasons.19 The available data constitute an unbalanced
panel of 402 enterprises spanning the period 1993-2002, after diﬀerencing.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Outsiders Insiders Full Sample
Turnover 278287.6 2553310 371483.8
(1032680) (3650919) (1329046)
Tangible Fixed Assets 104927.7 1910052 178874.6
(434820.4) (3166548) (846032.7)
Material Costs 121887.5 1434585 170505.9
(405237.3) (2076044) (614119)
Personnel Costs 51200.21 432732.1 66829.64
(224203.9) (598120.4) (261586.7)
Employees 1537 9344 1887
(7162.26) (12521.84) (7651.71)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; values expressed
in thousands of U.S. dollars.
Summary statistics of the variables derived from company accounts, along
with a comparative breakdown according to ﬁrms’ involvement in mergers
and acquisitions, are reported in table 1. Clearly, merger activity has, on
average, been dominated by the larger ﬁrms in the sector. Insiders’ ﬁgures
considerably exceed the corresponding means for both the overall sample and
the subset of outsiders. The dataset is fairly representative of paper manu-
facturing activity across the EEA. A comparison with aggregate statistics on
turnover and personnel costs available from Eurostat suggests that our data
cover approximately 75 per cent of the respective total ﬁgures for the sec-
tor. These general observations lend support to expectations that takeovers
19The annual data extracts are from editions 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2004, but the
data coverage corresponding to each release date is exhausted 1 to 2 years earlier due to
lags in reporting. Unfortunately, previous versions of the database are not available.
11would have an impact on the studied market.
Data on completed mergers and acquisitions were obtained from the SDC
database of Thomson Financial Securities. This source of comprehensive
information on worldwide markets covers corporate transactions that are
either valued above USD 1 million or involve ownership transfers of at least
5 per cent. The information is compiled and cross-referenced from various
sources, such as stock exchange commissions, trade publications, law ﬁrms,
surveys of investment banks, etc. We restrict our study to transactions that
result in a fusion of companies or a complete acquisition (100 per cent) of a
target ﬁrm’s stock. Although deals that constitute a transfer of controlling
interest are also likely to have an impact on the competitive environment,
their inclusion would involve making an arbitrary choice regarding the cutoﬀ
value. Therefore, we prefer to focus exclusively on full-scale mergers and
acquisitions.
For lack of a better common identiﬁer, the extracts from Amadeus and
SDC are matched by company name in a 3-step procedure.20 In this way, we
were able to identify the parties to 28 completed takeovers over the studied
period. Cumulative turnover over all deals in a year did not exceed 26 per
cent of total 3-digit industry turnover at the time of transaction. The corre-
sponding ﬁgure for the subsequent year was 28 per cent. Individual mergers
accounted for at most 19 per cent in the current year and 27 per cent in the
next period.
Measurement Issues
The use of nominal values, rather than deﬂated ones, oﬀers the advantage of
avoiding poor proxies for the actual price levels of inputs and output. Nev-
ertheless, some measurement error is inevitable, as company accounts data
do not accurately reﬂect true factor utilization. Speciﬁcally, ﬂuctuations in
the average work time per employee or per physical capital employed are
inadequately captured in ﬁnancial statements. Besides actual ﬂows of labor
20After controlling for blanks and accented characters, we perform successive matches
on (i) the full company name; (ii) the string of characters excluding 3 initial and 3 ending
ones; and (iii) the initial 9 characters of a name. Mismatches are then manually discarded.
12and capital services, ideally, we should also account for variations in the re-
spective inputs’ quality. Inaccurate measurement of true factor utilization
will result in a cyclical component in the error term. To control for the cycli-
cal impact in the regression, we introduce time ﬁxed eﬀects and the growth
rate of GDP as an additional macroeconomic variable capturing variations
in demand. Conventional accounting principles also deviate from economic
reasoning in the treatment of durable capital inputs acquired by the ﬁrm. Al-
though ﬁnancial accounts oﬀer the possibility to distribute the purchase cost
of an asset throughout its useful life, the interest tied up in the acquisition
typically is not recognized as a true economic cost. Similarly, any antici-
pated change in purchase price over the respective period is not reﬂected in
the input’s recorded value. Accordingly, we follow established practice in
the literature and transform the book value of tangible ﬁxed assets into the
corresponding ﬁgure at current replacement cost, using a simpliﬁed rental
price of capital:
PK = (rct + δt) × Pct
Country-level real interest rates, rct, and investment goods price indexes,
Pct, were obtained from the AMECO database of the European Commis-
sion’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Aﬀairs (DG ECFIN).
The annual depreciation rate is captured by δt. Due to data limitations and
diﬀerent accounting conventions regarding the useful lives of assets, we as-
sumed a uniform depreciation rate of 10 per cent for all ﬁrms. Alternative
values for the depreciation rate produced qualitatively similar results.
Results
To get a sense of the competitive environment in Europe’s paper manufac-
turing sector, we ﬁrst consider the evolution of average price-cost margins
over time. In the analysis, ﬁrms are treated as outsiders up to the year of
their initial participation in a merger. In regressions based on the full sample
of rivals, we include an additional dummy variable, MPTt, to control for the
occurrence of a deal. Thus, we are able to take account of the fact that some
13companies are involved in more than one takeover transaction over time.
Table 2: Average Annual Mark-up Evolution
Outsiders Rivals Full sample
1993 1.134 [0.066]∗∗∗ 1.133 [0.066]∗∗∗ 1.132 [0.066]∗∗∗
1994 1.162 [0.025]∗∗∗ 1.197 [0.026]∗∗∗ 1.198 [0.026]∗∗∗
1995 1.229 [0.032]∗∗∗ 1.238 [0.036]∗∗∗ 1.238 [0.036]∗∗∗
1996 1.235 [0.044]∗∗∗ 1.233 [0.041]∗∗∗ 1.236 [0.041]∗∗∗
1997 1.179 [0.024]∗∗∗ 1.191 [0.023]∗∗∗ 1.2 [0.037]∗∗∗
1998 1.243 [0.038]∗∗∗ 1.247 [0.042]∗∗∗ 1.247 [0.042]∗∗∗
1999 1.258 [0.017]∗∗∗ 1.269 [0.022]∗∗∗ 1.27 [0.024]∗∗∗
2000 1.251 [0.034]∗∗∗ 1.254 [0.037]∗∗∗ 1.257 [0.036]∗∗∗
2001 1.281 [0.041]∗∗∗ 1.268 [0.034]∗∗∗ 1.268 [0.034]∗∗∗
2002 1.3 [0.090]∗∗∗ 1.303 [0.090]∗∗∗ 1.303 [0.090]∗∗∗
MPTt 0.129 [0.187]
N 1410 1476 1476
R2 0.907 0.907 0.907
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. */**/*** indicate
signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 per cent, respectively.
The annual mark-ups reported in table 2 reveal a generally upward, al-
beit unsteady, trend. Furthermore, the observed pattern of ﬂuctuation is
identical across the sample of all ﬁrms, both with and without an explicit
control for mergers’ occurrence, and the outsiders’s subset. While companies
appear to have higher than average mark-ups at the time when they take
part in a takeover, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the
diﬀerent sets of cross-section estimates do not reveal major discrepancies in
magnitude.
Pooling all years, we test for the eﬀects of market concentration. Our
objective is to isolate the impact of merger-driven consolidation from that
due to ﬁrms’ internal growth, partial ownership transfers, downsizing or exits.
Accordingly, we compare price-cost margins’ sensitivity to the Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), the four-ﬁrm concentration ratio (C4) and the total
annual output amalgamation resulting from takeovers in the industry (CMS).
By construct, the latter measure is essentially a weighted dummy variable
taking the value of the respective market share consolidation rather than
14unity in every transaction year for a given 3-digit industry. For comparison,
we also investigate the eﬀect of takeovers, as captured by a conventional
dummy variable (MD). Since the combined entity’s output could diﬀer from
the respective constituents’ cumulative ﬁgure upon merging, we consider an
additional measure of takeover-driven concentration, based on actual market
share in the subsequent year.












Eﬀect 0.110 0.197 -0.012 -0.011 -0.035 -0.021
N 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 705 784












Eﬀect 0.108 0.188 -0.015 -0.015 -0.030 -0.025
MPTt 0.047 0.047 0.039 0.044 0.036 0 0
[0.112] [0.109] [0.111] [0.108] [0.093] [0.000] [0.000]
N 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476 738 823
R2 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.927 0.926
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. */**/*** indicate
signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 per cent, respectively. Eﬀects reported at
sample means of the relevant interaction terms.
15Point estimates for the respective concentration measures, along with cor-
responding average eﬀects, are reported in table 3. Our results indicate that
rival ﬁrms’ mark-ups are positively related to overall output consolidation in
the relevant 3-digit industry, but respond negatively to the component asso-
ciated with the occurrence of takeovers.21 Rather than undermining rivalry,
the studied transactions seem to enhance pro-eﬃciency pressure, though the
channel through which this may be achieved is unclear. In absolute terms,
merger-driven amalgamation has more modest eﬀects on price-cost margins
than general market concentration. This ﬁnding is robust across alternative
proxies, as well as across alternative samples of the merging entities’ com-
petitors. By and large, the eﬀect of market share consolidation resulting
from takeovers remains uniform from the time of transaction to the subse-
quent year, suggesting that the studied deals probably did not result in major
output reallocations between the merging ﬁrms and outsiders.
We also investigate whether the response to takeovers varies across rivals,
depending on their relative output ranking in the respective 3-digit industry.
The last two columns of table 3 display estimates for the sub-samples of ﬁrms
that belong to neither the top nor the bottom quartiles, deﬁned according to
individual market shares. While the vast majority of mergers can be traced to
companies with top-ranking sales volumes, their eﬀects are most pronounced,
both in terms of magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance, among competitors
falling in the interquartile range. Results for the top and bottom quartiles
are are not presented, as they are statistically insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding is
somewhat surprising and merits more detailed investigation.
For further insights into the industry-wide impact of merger-driven con-
centration, we distinguish transaction years according to the magnitude of the
corresponding total output consolidation using a market share threshold of
15 per cent.22 Whenever aggregate market share amalgamations exceed this
21To verify the robustness of our results, we replicated the regressions using the crude
mark-up observed directly from company accounts as the dependent variable. The results
are qualitatively analogous. Hausman tests strongly supported the appropriateness of
ﬁxed eﬀects estimation in all speciﬁcations.
22A ranking of transaction years according to the largest, rather than total, market
share consolidation yields qualitatively identical results.
16Table 4: Large-Scale vs. Small-Scale Consolidation
Contemporaneous Next period
Outsiders Rivals Outsiders Rivals
MDL −0.054 −0.064 −0.038 −0.046
[0.018]∗∗ [0.025]∗∗ [0.012]∗∗ [0.015]∗∗
MDS −0.024 −0.022 −0.043 −0.042
[0.028] [0.030] [0.020]∗ [0.026]
CMSL −0.197 −0.24 −0.155 −0.2
[0.087]∗ [0.107]∗ [0.044]∗∗∗ [0.063]∗∗
CMSS −0.259 −0.229 −0.354 −0.359
[0.507] [0.539] [0.335] [0.411]
EﬀectL -0.047 -0.057 -0.033 -0.043
EﬀectS -0.009 -0.008 -0.014 -0.014
MPTt 0.063 0.063 0.047 0.052
[0.099] [0.105] [0.108] [0.111]
N 1410 1410 1476 1476 1410 1410 1476 1476
R2 0.915 0.916 0.915 0.916 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.916
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at
10/5/1 per cent, respectively. Eﬀects reported at sample means of the relevant
interaction terms.
value, we consider that the respective period reﬂects a large-scale takeover-
related shock. The opposite qualiﬁer applies to years associated with a value
below or equal to the threshold. As in the previous step, we study mark-
ups’ response using proxies based on market share values both at the time
of transaction and for the subsequent year.
The results reported in table 4 suggest that only periods of large-scale
output consolidation have an impact on the price-cost margins of outsiders
and of rivals in general. This ﬁnding is consistent across alternative proxies
and deﬁnitions of competitors. Unsurprisingly, the eﬀects of large merger-
related shocks exceed in magnitude both the overall mean estimates reported
in table 3 and those of small shocks. The estimated average impact is also
larger when ﬁrms that have participated in a merger at another point in
time are not excluded from the regressions. A somewhat diﬀerent picture
emerges, however, when we combine the magnitude distinction of takeover-
related shocks with the quartile breakdown of ﬁrms according to their market
share positions.
17Table 5: Merger Scale & Firm Market Share, next period
Outsiders Rivals
Qb Qt Qint Qb Qt Qint
CMSLt+1 −0.418 −0.265 −0.221 −0.484 −0.552 −0.316
[0.360] [0.182]† [0.144]† [0.330] [0.316]∗ [0.210]†
CMSSt+1 −1.302 0.303 −0.253 −1.369 0.654 −0.254
[0.536]∗∗ [0.478] [0.232] [0.380]∗∗ [0.798] [0.315]
EﬀectL -0.087 -0.06 -0.047 -0.1 -0.125 -0.067
EﬀectS -0.051 0.011 -0.011 -0.055 0.024 -0.011
MPTt 0 −0.065 0
[0.000] [0.163] [0.000]
N 279 574 557 291 603 582
R2 0.942 0.916 0.929 0.94 0.917 0.935
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. †/*/**/*** indicate signiﬁcance
at 18/10/5/1 per cent, respectively. Eﬀects reported at sample means of the
relevant interaction terms.
Table 5 reports estimates of price-cost margins’ relationship to output
consolidation, computed on the basis of market share ﬁgures from the post-
transaction year.23 The results reveal that the mark-ups of ﬁrms in the
bottom quartile of the market share distribution respond negatively to pe-
riods of small-scale amalgamation. Similarly, the pricing behavior of com-
panies with largest (relative) sales seems to be disciplined in years reﬂecting
merger-driven market share consolidations in excess of 15 per cent. Large-
scale takeover shocks also appear to have an eﬀect, albeit somewhat more
modest, on the mark-ups of ﬁrms remaining in the interquartile range. How-
ever, these two relationships are only statistically signiﬁcant at 18 per cent
in the sample of outsiders. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis
that some ﬁrms are closer competitors than others within the same market.
The results also reﬂect, at least in part, our inability to achieve a better ap-
proximation of the relevant market due to the nature of the available data.
Most ﬁrms produce more than one good and engage in diﬀerent activities,
23The corresponding estimates based on merging parties’ combined market shares at
the time of the deal reveal a similar pattern. The only diﬀerence is that bottom-quartile
ﬁrms’ response to both large- and small-scale takeover shocks is positive, but statistically
insigniﬁcant.
18some possibly in related markets. While multi-market contact could explain
medium and large ﬁrms’ response to sizable takeovers at the 3-digit level,
the eﬀect of small transactions on the ﬁrms with most modest sales could
be explained by product space proximity or the fact that they belong to a
separate market altogether. Nevertheless, we observe a negative relationship
between price-cost margins and takeover-driven concentration at all instances
of statistically signiﬁcant estimates.
Naturally, a closely related question concerns the channel through which
this result is achieved. Our ﬁndings could indicate that the studied mergers
resulted in signiﬁcant cost savings whose pass-on to consumers via lower
prices disciplined rivals’ mark-ups. Alternatively, the negative response may
reﬂect enhanced inﬂuence of the integrated companies over factor markets
and possible foreclosure eﬀects. Unfortunately, we do not have data that
would enable us to investigate parallel developments in input and output
prices. Competition authorities across the EU are probably best positioned
to undertake in-depth ex post assessments, which could also contribute to
the ﬁne-tuning of policy approaches.
In a second-best attempt to shed some light on the driving force behind
our results, we distinguish the eﬀects of horizontal and vertical mergers within
the limits imposed by data availability. Ideally, we would like to determine
if merging ﬁrms operate in the same relevant market, which would require
detailed information on the range of products they manufacture. Short of
product-level detail, however, we have information on the diversity of each
company’s activities according to the NACE and NAICS classiﬁcations, with
corresponding levels of disaggregation up to the fourth and sixth digit. The
latter breakdown may be regarded as an acceptable approximation of relevant
markets, even though the actual combination of products that constitute a
ﬁrm’s output is unobservable. Nevertheless, we are unable to disentangle the
shares of total revenue and costs associated with each line of operations. For
lack of alternatives, we consider a transaction to be of horizontal nature if the
target company’s primary activity code matches any of the codes reported by
its acquirer. A merger is regarded as vertical if there is no overlap between
19the acquirer’s scope of operations and the target’s principal activity.24
Table 6: Joint Horizontal & Vertical Merger Eﬀects
Outsiders Rivals
Nace Naics Nace Naics
MDHt −0.052 −0.058 −0.04 −0.045
[0.026]∗ [0.031]∗ [0.025] [0.030]
MDV t −0.079 −0.077 −0.069 −0.067
[0.029]∗∗ [0.022]∗∗∗ [0.029]∗∗ [0.024]∗∗
CMCHt 16.262 14.564 20.247 18.135
[12.951] [11.612] [16.611] [14.892]
CMSV t −0.166 −0.166 −0.196 −0.196
[0.076]∗ [0.076]∗ [0.089]∗ [0.089]∗
EﬀectH 0.016 0.029 0.020 0.036
EﬀectV -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014
MPTt 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043
[0.111] [0.110] [0.105] [0.110]
N 1410 1410 1410 1410 1476 1476 1476 1476
R2 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915
Outsiders Rivals
Nace Naics Nace Naics
MDHt+1 −0.082 −0.076 −0.078 −0.069
[0.094] [0.090] [0.092] [0.088]
MDV t+1 −0.132 −0.098 −0.127 −0.095
[0.098] [0.095] [0.100] [0.094]
CMCHt+1 −2.535 0.542 −3.134 0.65
[1.502] [0.245]∗ [0.774]∗∗∗ [0.366]
CMCV t+1 −0.15 −0.144 −0.195 −0.188
[0.042]∗∗∗ [0.041]∗∗∗ [0.054]∗∗∗ [0.059]∗∗
EﬀectH -0.023 0.008 -0.028 0.009
EﬀectV -0.013 -0.013 -0.017 -0.018
MPTt 0.032 0.064 0.035 0.053
[0.105] [0.086] [0.106] [0.104]
N 1410 1410 1410 1410 1476 1476 1476 1476
R2 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10/5/1
per cent, respectively. Eﬀects reported at sample means of the relevant interaction
terms.
Estimates and corresponding average eﬀects at the time a deal came into
24In general, target ﬁrms tend to be smaller than the bidders and thus may be more
closely associated with a primary activity code. As this particular line of operations is
most likely to motivate the acquisition, it could provide an indication of the industry where
the takeover’s eﬀects would be strongest.
20eﬀect, as well as based on ﬁgures from the subsequent year, are reported
in table 6. The results are broadly in line with our previous ﬁndings, but
highlight that the nature of takeovers may play an important role. Clearly,
vertical mergers have a depressing eﬀect on outsiders’ and rivals’ price-cost
margins under both classiﬁcations of company activities. Evidence on hori-
zontal transactions’ impact is more mixed and sensitive to the level of dis-
aggregation underpinning market deﬁnitions. In fact, some of the takeovers
deemed horizontal under the NACE classiﬁcation reﬂect a closer vertical
relationship according to the six-digit NAICS breakdown. Thus, it is not
surprising that the only positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is
associated with the more precisely deﬁned horizontal transactions. The ob-
served pattern suggests that vertical integration accounts for most of the
pressure on outsider ﬁrms to enhance eﬃciency. Therefore, it may not be
unrealistic to expect that anti-competitive inﬂuence over upstream markets
constitutes the predominant force in disciplining rivals’ mark-ups. While our
ﬁndings merely present broad-brush evidence, they point to the importance
of carefully evaluating post-merger competitive outcomes.
Conclusion
This paper draws on a representative data set of independently-owned paper
manufacturing companies to study the competitive eﬀects of full-scale mer-
gers and acquisitions across the European Economic Area. Using alternative
proxies, we ﬁnd that non-merging competitors’ mark-ups are increasing with
overall market concentration, but tend to be disciplined upon occurrence of
takeovers. This result contradicts the conventional wisdom that mergers may
be conducive to slack in ﬁrms internal organization. Notably, the negative
response of price-cost margins is primarily associated with vertical integra-
tion transactions. While data constraints prevent an investigation of parallel
developments in input and output prices, the emphasis on non-horizontal
takeovers could raise concerns about potential anti-competitive inﬂuence over
input markets. Our ﬁndings highlight the importance of systematic ex post
assessments of mergers’ impact and suggest an interesting avenue for further
21research.
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25Appendix
The EEA Paper Manufacturing Market
We focus on paper manufacturing ﬁrms on the premise that the bulk of their
output at the 3-digit NACE level could be considered a workable approxi-
mation of a homogeneous product. Accordingly, our investigation concerns
two broadly deﬁned markets: Pulp, paper and paperboard (NACE 211) and
Articles of paper and paperboard (NACE 212). While further diﬀerentiation
within each of these segments is certainly appropriate, compartmentalization
into distinct product sub-categories may be relatively less pronounced than
in other manufacturing industries. For instance, although pulp can be broken
down into several types according to manufacturing processes or ﬁbre input,
the European Commission has traditionally regarded it as a single product
market. Similarly, notwithstanding the distinct characteristics of wood-free
coated and wood-free uncoated paper, relevant market delineation has been
left open on the observation that manufacturers can switch from one type to
the other without incurring major costs. For most products the Commission
has also systematically found the relevant geographic market to have at least
EEA dimension. The exceptions are tissue products and paper merchanting
activities, for which national boundaries may be relevant.
A particular mention merits the subsegment of carbonless paper, which
has been found to constitute a separate product market “due to its special
characteristics, end uses and limited substitutability from the demand side”.
In 2001, the Commission found evidence that 11 companies with operations
in that subsegment took part in price-ﬁxing and market-sharing agreements
lasting from 1992 through at least 1995. However, as these manufacturers
accounted for about 90 per cent of carbonless paper sales in Europe, their
collusion may have had limited repercussions on other competitors within the
relevant market. The lack of ﬁrm-speciﬁc product-level information makes it
impossible to identify potentially aﬀected rivals in related markets. EU com-
petition authorities are probably best positioned to meet the informational
requirements for a more detailed investigation. In any event, the cartel would
26have weakened the involved ﬁrms’ incentives to pursue productive eﬃciency,
so that ﬁndings to the opposite eﬀect in relation to mergers may be somewhat
understated.
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